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Abstract 
This paper is based on the premise that although 
liberalisation is assumed to result in market friendly 
incentives that can encourage the accumulation of capital 
and more efficient allocation of resources, the interplay 
between market forces, government policy and social 
processes continues to shape and re-shape the tea 
commodity market. In the midst of what seems like 
expanded choices are struggles and uncertainties, some of 
which determine what the actors concerned come to count 
as success or failure. The paper is an attempt to understand 
the smallholder tea commodity market from the point of 
view of the Soko Huru trade. More specifically, the paper 
looks at how the Soko Huru trade is organised, the forces 
that direct and influence the buying and selling of green 
leaf, the resultant formal and informal linkages, and how 
these structures affect the role of tea as a source of livelihood 
among rural households. Attention is paid to the written 
and unwritten rules that govern the linkages that Soko Huru 
traders maintain with tea growers and various categories 
of end users, and how these come to influence the tea 
commodity market and the strategies that traders apply so 
as to protect their interests. 
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Introduction 
Tea was first planted in Kenya in 1903 and later spread to other 
districts on a commercial basis in the 1920s. However, it was not 
until about 1959 when tea was first introduced to African areas on 
exper imental basis under the auspices of the Special Crops 
Deve lopment Authori ty (SCDA) . In 1952 tea g rowing was 
introduced among smallholders on a pilot basis in Kirinyaga and 
in 1957 a tea factory was constructed for purposes of processing 
green leaf from small-scale growers. This was followed by the 
introduction of field extension services for smallholder tea growers 
and the establishment of two marketing boards, namely: Central 
Province African Tea Growing and Marketing Board (CPATGMB) 
and the Nyanza and Rift Valley Provinces African Tea Growing 
and Marketing Board (NRVPATGMB). The most radical shift, 
however, involved the privatisation and liberalisation of the tea 
sector that culminated in a change over f rom the Kenya Tea 
Development Authority to the Kenya Tea Development Agency 
Limited, for the express purpose of handing over power to tea 
growers. 
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The Kenya Tea Deve lopment Author i ty ( K T D A ) was f i rs t 
established as a State Corporation in 1964 with the primary 
mandate of managing the smallholder tea sector, consisting of 
growers with less than 10 hectares of land under tea. The KTDA 
has a membership of over 300,000 tea growers and these are served 
through 45 factories, all of them fully owned and managed by 
smallholder tea growers. The KTDA renders certain services to 
smal lholder tea growers, including the management of tea factories, 
green leaf transportation, procurement of production goods, and 
marketing and payment of tea proceeds to growers (Kenya 1999, 
p. 8). One of the emerging consequences of the privatisation and 
liberalisation of the tea sector is the mushrooming of private traders, 
commonly known as Soko Huru. 
The rest of this paper looks at how the Soko Huru green leaf traders 
o rganise and interact with the tea marke t and the type of 
opportunities that these operations portend and how those who 
utilise them perceive this outlet. It is noted that some of the forces 
that contribute to how people utilise market opportunities include 
externally stimulated processes such as policy guidelines and the 
presence of competitors. The interface between Soko Huru 
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operations and rural livelihoods is analysed in light of the options 
that tea producers and traders face, in an attempt to meet their 
consumption and economic necessities and the context in which 
these decisions are arrived at. It is observed that the forces that 
govern Soko Huru could be social, cultural, political or economic 
in nature. Therefore, whereas the tea market is fairly structured 
with rules and regulations that touch on almost every step that 
those concerned must take as they market their green leaf, the 
s t ruc ture of this marke t is a p roduc t of ex terna l ly dr iven 
requ i rements and s tandards , many of which are, however , 
constantly negotiated. To this end, it is concluded that the totality 
of the environment where a business operates is fundamental to 
understanding the Soko Huru trade. 
Discussions draw from open interviews and survey data focusing 
on Soko Huru traders in the Nyamira-Kericho tea corridor. Open 
interviews preceded the survey and respondents were identified on 
the job and through references. A total of 12 open interviews were 
conducted. Knowledge and information gathered during this period 
contributed to the compilation of a sampling frame for the survey. 
Actual respondents were drawn from the Soko Huru traders 
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operating within designated KTDA buying centres or in the vicinity. 
A total of 50 questionnaires were administered. These data sources 
were triangulated using informal discussions with groups of 
growers at the buying centres and direct observations of what takes 
place as growers and Soko Huru traders link and de-link with one 
another. 
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The Soko Huru Structure and Organisation 
Soko Huru traders consist of various segments of green leaf traders 
who operate as middlemen linking up tea producers with processing 
factories. Levels of involvement for these traders vary with the 
nature of linkages that these traders maintain with both the sellers 
and the buyers of green leaf. Generally, however, this categorisation 
is a function of the role that each trader plays in the marketing 
chain. Three main types of Soko Huru traders thus emerge: agents, 
brokers and out-growers. Out-growers are large-scale tea producers 
who are registered with the Kenya Tea Growers Association to 
deliver green leaf to multi-national tea factories. Some of the out-
growers obtain part of the green leaf that they sell to these factories 
from small-scale tea growers who cannot sell directly to multi-
national companies. It is this out-sourcing that brings about the 
need for brokers and agents. Brokers form the linkage between 
small-scale tea growers and out-growers and they play a key role 
in the Soko Huru trade. It is them who source green leaf from the 
smallholder tea growers and then deliver it to multi-national 
factories on behalf of the out-growers who contract them. 
In almost all cases, brokers depend on agents to reach the 
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small-scale tea producers. In some instances, a broker may be given 
money by an out-grower to go and source leaf and del iver it to the 
factory on behalf of an out-grower. The broker may or may not 
use an agent. In either case, however, there is no time when the 
small-scale tea farmer is in touch with a multi-national tea factory. 
Conversely, some small-scale tea growers operate in Soko Huru 
by leasing out their tea farms to registered out-growers or other 
traders for a specified period of time. Once they agree on a price, 
the out-grower may get his own labour to pick the leaf or the small-
scale farmer may pick his/her own leaf and deliver it all to the out-
grower. On the part of the out-grower (or any other person leasing 
land under tea), the incentive is ready access to green leaf at a time 
when it is in short supply. At this point, the tea trade operates with 
the bare minimum of linkages. 
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Figure 1: Linkages between various Soko Huru traders 
As is evident from Figure 1, green leaf f rom small-scale growers 
finds its way to multi-national tea factories through three main 
outlets. The first and most intense is where agents solicit green 
leaf from small-scale growers on behalf of brokers. Upon making 
cash payments, the brokers deliver the green leaf to out-growers 
who then deliver this to the multi-national tea companies with whom 
they are registered. On the other hand, some brokers solicit green 
leaf from small-scale growers without using an agent and then 
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deliver this directly to the processing factory but in the name of a 
registered out-grower, with whom this broker has an agreement. 
The third line of purchase involves out-growers who buy green 
leaf directly from small-scale growers and deliver it to the multi-
national factory without the assistance of agents or brokers. In all 
instances, agents and small-scale growers do not deliver green leaf 
directly to the multi-national factories, largely because of logistical 
constraints. These include lack of a working capital to invest in 
the purchase anc transportation of green leaf. 
Many of the agents and brokers claimed that they were introduced 
to the Soko Huru trade by KTDA green leaf buying clerks in 
response to requests from brokers and out-growers to find them 
reliable persons to work with. Others, however, joined through 
being introduced by brokers who knew them and considered them 
to have good public relations. In addition, people who get considered 
for the position of agent also need to come from the locality where 
the green leaf is to be obtained. Agents are paid at a daily rate of 
between Ksh.100 and Kshs.150, exclusive of lunch, and all of 
them reported that they went into Soko Huru because it pays well 
and they were jobless. On the other hand, brokers are paid on 
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commission or they my draw their profits by re-selling the green 
leaf to out-growers at a negotiated margin. Apparently, there is 
some interdependence between the Soko Huru trade and the KTDA 
green leaf market to the extent that employees deal with one another 
more as collaborators than competitors. This relationship is, 
however, full of contradictions. The KTDA Leaf Buying Clerks 
continuously complain about the damage that Soko Huru is causing 
their market. They state that Soko Huru is an unfair competitor 
because it reaps where it did not sow with regard to the provision 
of support services to small-scale tea producers, such as extension, 
farm inputs and infrastructure development. On the other hand, a 
general ranking of the problems facing Soko Huru suggests that 
the KTDA is the biggest impediment to the advancement of this 
trade, largely because of the restrictions that the KTDA puts on 
small-scale growers. Paradoxically, agents come second on the 
list of impediments and ahead of even the local administration. 
This begs the question, who is engaged in Soko Huru and what 
governs entry into this trade? 
Getting Enlisted in Soko Huru: Working Capital, Negotiation 
Skills and Know-how 
9 
IDS Working Paper No. 540 
T h e o v e r r i d i n g a s s u m p t i o n of the s t r u c t u r a l a d j u s t m e n t 
programmes, first introduced in Kenya in the 1980s, was that 
market-oriented policies will lead to enlarged opportunities and 
these will in turn result in improved institutional performance and 
an enhanced well-being for producers, among other actors. The 
experiences of the Soko Huru traders examined suggest that the 
expected enlarged opportunities cannot be realised in isolation. 
Instead, utilisation of opportunities arising from liberalisation is a 
function of resources at hand, interpersonal skills, and access to 
relevant information. The discussions below, therefore, look at 
some of the salient characteristics of Soko Huru traders and how 
these come to determine the nature and level of operations, and the 
contribution of this trade to the rural economy. 
Generally, Soko Huru is a male dominated business. However, 
within this, there are several variations. Most Soko Huru traders 
operate as agents (70%). The rest operate as a brokerage (18%) 
and out-growers (12%). Agents dominate Soko Huru operations 
because this level of operation requires fewer investments, if any, 
especially those of a monetary nature (Figure 2). Agents mainly 
operate in the vicinity of their homes and therefore only require 
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good inter-personal skills, negotiation abilities, and a reliable 
network of green leaf growers. On the other hand, brokers must 
have some working capital to purchase and/or transport green leaf 
and this involves taking some amount of risk. Out-growers are 
even fewer because of the stringent rules and regulations that they 
must fulfil before being registered with any of the multi-national 
tea processing companies. 
At the time of joining Soko Huru, start-up capital invested ranged 
between Kshs. 2,000 and Kshs. 200,000 and about 30 per cent of 
the traders borrowed the money. The amounts borrowed ranged 
between Kshs. 3,000 and Kshs. 300,000 and the majority of traders 
borrowed Kshs. 10,000 only. Although over two thirds of the Soko 
Huru traders work in league with others, only very few of these 
work-mates have a share in the business. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Soko Huru traders by level of 
involvement (%) 
General ly, Soko Huru traders comprise of the young and previously 
unemployed. Most of the traders are in their twenties or early thirties 
and many of these are engaged as agents or brokers. On the other 
hand, out-growers are comparatively older, suggesting therefore 
that access to land and associated resources gets better with passage 
of time. However, the fact that young people who could otherwise 
have the energy required to participate in Soko Huru cannot do so 
because of finances testifies to the fact that there are obstacles that 
make liberalisation less meaningful, especially among the resource 
poor (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Le\el of engagement in the Soko Huru trade by traders'age (%) 
Cut-grower Broker />gent Total 
D Be r^e 1959 Q) 1960s S 1970s a 1980s 
In terms of levels of education, most of the people engaged in Soko 
Huru are school-leavers with 110 formal training. The majority had 
a secondary school level of education (64%) and a sizeable 
proportion (26%) had completed only primary level schooling. 
However, some of the traders had undergone college level training 
(6%) and another 4 percent were university graduates. Again, the 
need for some skill and possible exposure is clearly evidenced by 
the fact that all the traders have some education and their level of 
involvement in Soko Huru tends to vary with level of schooling. 
For instance, all the university graduates engaged in Soko Huru 
were operating at the level of out-growers and this was also the 
13 
IDS Working Paper No. 540 
case with almost all those with a college level education. Both 
primary and secondary school leavers mainly operate as agents or 
brokers (Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Level of involvement in the Soko Huru trade by education (%) 
• Primary QSeconda r y Q C o l l e g e BUn ive rs i t y 
Much as the tea market was liberalised only recently, some of the 
traders reported having been engaged in the Soko Huru trade for 
over six years already. The majority, however, had been in Soko 
Huru for four years and some of the entrants were only in their 
second month. Again, people with the least experience are mainly 
engaged as agents, although some of the longest serving traders 
continue to operate at the same level. In other words, although 
level of involvement is a function of resources at hand, a change in 
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circumstances for the better does not always occasion an upward 
movement in terms of level of operation and subsequent earnings. 
Instead, some of the longest-serving Soko Huru traders have 
continued to operate as agents (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Level of involvement in Soko Huru trade by number of 
months operated in the trade (%) 
Out-grovwr Broker Agent Total 
B 1 2 or lass 0 1 3 1 0 2 4 S 2 5 t o 3 6 O 3 7 o r m o m 
Sixty per cent of the Soko Huru traders are also tea growers with 
acreage under tea ranging from less than one acre to as many as 
164 acres. Most Soko Huru traders are small-scale tea growers 
and all of them operate as agents or brokers. Brokers are spread 
rather equally between tea growers and non-growers whereas most 
of the agents are non-tea growers (Figure 6). Seemingly, Soko Huru 
has brought non-tea growers on board the tea commodity market. 
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At the same time, however, tea growing is in itself a boast to 
involvement in Soko Huru operations. And, except for out-growers 
who sell all their green leaf through multi-national companies, the 
rest of the Soko Huru traders attempt to utilise all existing tea 
market outlets by selling simultaneously through the KTDA and 
the Soko Huru. 
Figure 6: Level of involvement in the Soko Huru trade by acreage 
under tea (%) 
Out-grower Broker Agent Total 
D None sSma l l - S ca l e •med i um-La rge 
Comparatively, Soko Huru operations are a major source of income 
for those concerned. For instance, monthly earnings from Soko Huru 
operations average about Kshs. 27,800 and the highest paid person 
earns Kshs. 250,000. On the other hand, combined incomes from 
other sources for Soko Huru traders average only Kshs. 7,520 
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and the highest paid of them received Kshs. 100,000 per month. 
However, in both instances Soko Huru traders earn an average of 
Kshs. 4,000 per month and the lowest paid person receives only 
Kshs. 500 a month. 
As would be expected, earnings from Soko Huru vary with level 
of involvement. Out-growers earn the most money with one half of 
them earning over wshs. 100,000 per month from Soko Huru. 
Brokers are the next best remunerated with a majority of them 
earning up to Kshs. 50,000 per month. However, most agents earn 
less than Kshs. 5,000 per month from Soko Huru (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: A comparison of monthly earnings from Soko Huru 
operations (Kshs.) 
18 
IDS Working Paper No. 540 
Figure 8: A comparison of monthly earnings from various other 
sources (Kshs.) 
Seemingly, the pattern of monetary gain derived from Soko Huru 
is closely related to earnings from other sources. Although earnings 
from these other sources don' t seem to bring in as much money, 
out-growers are still the highest income earners with over three-
quarters of them getting Kshs. 50,000 or more per month. Brokers 
and agents alike earn no more than Kshs. 50,000 and the majority 
earns only Kshs. 5,000 or less per month (Figure 8). 
Evidently, the Soko Huru trade is a preserve of those who have 
resources and/or the knowledge required for making an entry. 
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The traders constitute a group of people that is knowledgeable of 
the going in the tea sector and who have therefore devised a strategy 
for making a living. To be able to join the chain and remain in it, 
aspiring traders must also have the right networks. In the next 
section, we look at what it takes for Soko Huru trader to obtain 
green-leaf. 
Linking Up with Green Leaf Producers: Trust, Networks and 
Relationships 
In spite of a seeming spontaneity, the Soko Huru market is fairly 
organised and structured. But, this structure is neither fixed nor 
smooth. What happens and when this does happen is determined 
by the supply and demand configuration and the eventual direction 
is a function of existing networks and how well these are reinforced 
and sustained. Hence, much as the Soko Huru traders do not have 
a written contract with the growers from whom they purchase green 
leaf on a constant basis, there are many unwritten rules that guide 
and stabilise operations. Similarly, amongst themselves, the dealings 
of Soko Huru traders are fairly informal and dependent on 
consistency, trust and network building. 
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The Soko Huru traders follow fairly definite routes every day, and 
most of these are designated K.TDA buying centres and major 
markets. The choice of these buying points is deliberate and guided 
by the consideration that this gives traders easy access to green 
leaf, especially what may be rejected by the KTDA. At these buying 
centres, the agents inspect the leaf while awaiting brokers or out-
erowers. They also ensure that green leaf is available and ready for 
collection by brokers or out-growers at a desi'mated time. However, 
these agents do not discuss the price of green leaf with the farmer, 
except in times of scarcity when they may negotiate upwards in 
order to lure growers into selling to their networks. The brokers too 
do not negotiate the price with the growers because the entire group 
of traders has an agreed upon price of seven shillings per kilogram 
of green leaf and nobody is allowed to undercut others. Traders who 
dare undercut face assault or their vehicles are blocked from reaching 
the factories, the final point of sale. 
Generally, the Soko Huru operations are fairly networked and 
peaceful with each dealer having a demarcated territory, and a 
majority of them (40%) visit between one and two centres. However, 
some traders go to as many as 12 buying centres. 
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In spite of being regular buyers, only one out of the fif ty traders 
interviewed reported having a written contract with the growers 
from whom he buys the green leaf. The rest depend on monopolising 
and frequenting buying centres from which they obtain their green 
leaf. In a month, these traders handle an average of 35,000 
kilograms of green leaf, ranging between 200 kilograms to 240,000 
kilograms. 
Most of the traders are known in the areas where they operate 
ei ther because of f requen t ing these places or through their 
representatives on the ground, namely, agents. On any one given 
day, the traders purchase green leaf from as few as two people but 
this sometimes goes as high 400 growers. The majority of growers 
who sell to Soko Huru traders are women (92%). In a few instances, 
these traders also buy from men and children. Women dominate 
the list of supplies to Soko Huru because of skewed household 
level resource and asset distribution. Generally, payment for green 
leaf marketed through KTDA is made to registered landowners 
and the majori ty of them are men. This means therefore that 
women's access to these cash incomes is not guaranteed yet; most 
of these women are directly responsible for the daily needs of their 
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households. And since many of the women lack other sources of 
income, Soko Huru becomes a practical solution. 
When there is scarcity of leaf, agents apply all sorts of strategies 
to ensure that growers sell green leaf to their preferred outlets. For 
instance, the agents make sure that growers can trust them and 
their networks by buying from them regularly, by paying instantly 
or on time, and by appearing fair in determining the amount of 
green leaf received. They also entice these growers with persuasive 
language and ensure that they are not mistreated in the course of 
weighing. Some of the agents reported that they select their growers 
on the basis of their economic means on the assumption that the 
needy ones will be easy to influence and contain. They also go for 
growers whom they know and who therefore have a relationship to 
keep. When all else fails, the agents use propaganda against their 
competitors. 
However, the amount of green leaf purchased is also determined by 
cash at hand, the willingness of the farmer to sell to Soko Huru, 
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the carrying capacity of the vehicles in use and the amount of leaf 
that the out-grower in question is expected to deliver to the 
processing factory. However, in the case of the latter, out-growers 
are allowed to exceed their daily capacity whenever their fellow 
suppliers are unable to meet their designated quantities. Therefore, 
each of the out-growers and their agents and brokers alike will 
keep watch over the performance of their competitors with the 
intention of stepping in to fill their daily quarters. In some instances, 
this may entail taking a chance at the factory gate and in the event 
that there is no such room, the green leaf is discarded. 
Between the Buying Centre and the Factory: Competition, 
Mistrust and Compliance Failure 
Soko Huru demands long working hours. Most of the traders 
reported that their day begins at 5.00 a.m. and ends late in the 
afternoon when they deliver and finish weighing their green leaf at 
the multi-national tea factories. On average, operations take 10 
hours daily, although some of the traders reported that they work 
for only two hours. The traders cover up to 200 kilometres each, 
and some travel for less than a kilometre in the search for green 
leaf. Ordinarily, the traders start collecting leaf from the furthest 
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buying centres early in the morning and advance toward the factory 
where they then deliver their day's collection by mid afternoon. 
This process is repeated daily for five days a week (Monday to 
Friday), during which period the traders compete for a market to 
sell their green leaf, giving way to mistrust and a failure in required 
rules and regulations. 
Although Soko Huru involves several people, some actually serve 
the interests of the same 'mas ter ' . All the green leaf purchased 
through Soko Huru ends up with mult i -nat ional companies 
operating in the surrounding areas. These Soko Huru participating 
processing factories are found within a radius of 12 to 40 kilometres. 
However, only out-growers registered with these multi-national 
companies and who have the approval of the Tea Board of Kenya 
can sell green leaf to these companies. Therefore, the brokers sell 
the green leaf that they purchase to out-growers on a day-to-day 
basis or on a monthly account whereby some of them actually 
deliver green leaf directly to the factories but in the name of an 
out-grower. On the other hand, some agents work for brokers or 
out-growers or both depending on the demand for green leaf. 
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Purchased green leaf is stuffed into sisal sacks and transported in 
pickup trucks, which must be roadworthy and registered with the 
receiving factories. In response to the question on where they sell 
their green leaf, slightly over one third (35%) of the traders stated 
that they sell directly to multi-national companies and a similar 
number sell through brokers (33%) and out-growers (31 %). Only 
a f ew t r ade r s sel l t h r o u g h seve ra l of t he se ou t l e t s ( 2 % ) 
simultaneously. (Figure 9). 
Figure 9: The relationship between the small-scale tea growers 
and the various players in the Soko Huru trade 
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Like the growers from who they buy, most of the Soko Huru traders 
that sell directly to the factories have no written contract witli 
intermediary buyers of their green leaf. Many of the traders are 
commissioned on a daily basis with or without the capital with 
which to purchase green leaf. Others just go ahead and purchase 
sreen leaf from growers in anticipation of selling to out-growers. 
In spite of these arrangements, only 57 percent of the traders were 
able to sell all the green leaf that they purchase, due to limited 
capacity at the factory level. The left over leaf is taken back home 
and discarded in the farm or it is dumped on the roadside. 
The relationship between small-scale growers and the various Soko 
Huru traders that they come into contact with is sometimes full of 
mistrust. Grower s gave accounts of t raders who exploi ted 
longstanding relationships to con them out of their green leaf. Such 
traders seek green leaf on credit from growers and refuse to honour 
their pledge. Others literary take off with the money as soon as 
they weigh and receive leaf. In both instances, such traders 
thereafter change routes or personnel and growers are left with no 
alternative for redress. 
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The agents too had their story to tell. They reported that there are 
times when brokers take leaf on credit and the agents stand surety. 
However, some of these brokers thereafter avoid routes where they 
have debts and this ruins the agent's relationship with his clientele. 
On other occasions, when leaf is in plenty, brokers and out-growers 
become so choosy about "quantity" that most growers are not able 
to sell yet they operate on the belief that leaf that is sold to Soko 
Huru has no quality requirements and they therefore expect the 
brokers to just buy. When leaf is rejected, it is the agents who face 
the wrath of the growers and this becomes quite challenging as 
their survival hinges on the co-operation of growers. This is also 
heightened in instances where brokers fail to collect leaf because 
of strict quarters, poor transport, or any other factor that may 
constrain them from going to collect leaf from regular clients. The 
question is therefore does Soko Huru have a future? 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
This paper set out to analyse the Soko Huru tea market chain. 
Discussions have shown that both formal and informal rules and 
regulations govern this market. 
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In general, the future of Soko Huru is dependent on the monetary 
gains that this trade will continue to bring to the farmer. Hence, 
much as small-scale tea growers understand that selling through 
Soko Huru reduces or even totally denies them access to an end of 
year bonus; their immediate needs continue to give logic to the 
decisions that govern such choices. There is a general consensus 
from growers and traders alike that money earned through Soko 
Hui u continues to enable them educate l.ieir children, meet their 
day-to-day needs, and investments in several businesses including 
the Soko Huru itself. In spite of these perceived benefits, the losers 
are many largely because of the process through which liberalisation 
came into being. Therefore, whether the KTDA will succeed in 
convincing small-scale tea growers that selling through Soko Huru 
will impact negatively on the productivity of their crop because 
farmers go against recommended agronomic practices is dependent 
on whether the growers will be in a position to access much needed 
cash incomes. The leaf that is sold through Soko Huru is, if left 
on the farm, expected to drop and contribute to necessary biomass 
and hence raise ail fertility etc. 
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It is also reported that pruning this leaf delays regeneration. The 
onus therefore is on the KTDA to make their prices competitive, 
and this begins with providing an efficient marketing system that 
would, among other things, allow small-scale tea growers the 
opportunity to make informed and untethered decisions. 
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